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ABSTRACT 
As an immune  inspired  algorithm, the  Dendritic Cell Algo- 
rithm (DCA)  has been applied  to a range  of problems, par- 
ticularly in the area of intrusion detection. Ideally, the intru- 
sion detection  should  be  performed in real-time, to  contin- 
uously  detect misuses  as soon as they occur.  Consequently, 
the analysis  process performed by an intrusion detection sys- 
tem  must   operate in  real-time  or  near-to  real-time.    The 
analysis  process  of the  DCA  is  currently  performed offline, 
therefore to improve the algorithm’s performance we suggest 
the development of a real-time analysis  component. The ini- 
tial step of the development is to apply  segmentation to the 
DCA.  This  involves  segmenting  the current  output  of  the 
DCA into slices and performing the analysis  in various  ways. 
Two segmentation approaches are introduced and  tested in 
this paper, namely  antigen  based  segmentation  (ABS)  and 
time  based  segmentation  (TBS). The  results  of the corre- 
sponding  experiments suggest that applying  segmentation 
produces  different  and  significantly  better results   in  some 
cases,  when  compared to the  standard DCA  without  seg- 
mentation.  Therefore, we conclude  that the segmentation is 
applicable to the DCA for the purpose of real-time analysis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Artificial   Immune  Systems   (AIS)  [4] are  computer  sys- 
tems inspired  by both theoretical immunology and observed 
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immune  functions, principles and  models,  which can be ap- 
plied to real world problems. As the natural immune  system  
is designed  to protect  the  body  from  a wealth  of invading 
micro-organisms, artificial  immune  systems   are  developed 
to provide  the  same  defensive  properties within  a comput- 
ing  context.    Initially AIS  based  themselves  upon  simple 
models  of the human  immune  system.  As noted  by  Stibor 
et  al.  [16], ‘first  generation  algorithms’  including  negative 
and  clonal  selection  do  not produce  the  same high  perfor- 
mance  as  the human   immune  system.    These  algorithms, 
negative selection  in particular, are prone  to problems with 
scaling  and  the  generation  of excessive  false  alarms   when 
used  to detect intruders in  computer networks.   Recently 
developed  AIS use more rigourous and up-to-date immunol- 
ogy and  are developed  in collaboration with immunologists. 
The resulting algorithms are believed to encapsulate the de- 
sirable  properties of immune  systems  including  robustness 
and  error  tolerance. 
One of such ‘second generation’ AIS is the Dendritic Cell 
Algorithm (DCA)   [7].   This  algorithm  is  inspired   by  the 
function  of the  dendritic cells  of the innate  immune   sys- 
tem and  incorporates the principles of a  key  novel  theory 
in immunology, termed the danger  theory [13]. This theory 
suggests that dendritic cells (DCs)  are  responsible for  the 
initial  detection of invading  micro-organisms.  An  abstract 
model  of natural DC  behaviour is used  as  the foundation 
of the  developed algorithm.  Currently, the  DCA  has  been 
successfully  applied  to numerous problem  domains,  includ- 
ing  port scan  detection [7], Botnet  detection  [1] and  as  a 
classifier  for robotic  security  [14].   These  applications  have 
suggested  that the DCA  shows not only  good 
performance on detection rate, but also the ability to 
reduce  the rate of false  alarms  in comparison to other  
systems  including  Self Organising Maps [10]. The majority 
of applications to which the DCA  is applied   involve  the  
detection of  unauthorised use and  abuse  of computer 
systems  and networks  - a prob- lem termed intrusion 
detection.  Systems  designed  to detect intrusions are  
termed  intrusion detection systems.   The  de- velopment of  
reliable  and  sophisticated intrusion detection systems is 
non trivial, as such systems  need to process huge amounts of 
data in a short period of time and simultaneously achieve  
high levels of detection accuracy. 
As stated by Zhang  et  al.  [17], in practice,  intrusion  de- 
tection is a real-time critical mission.  This means that intru- 
sions should be detected as soon as possible or at least before 
an attack eventually succeds.  The detection speed which re- 
flects the  time  taken for detecting intrusions,  is the  actual 
key to prevent successful  attacks. We believe that an effec- 
tive intrusion detection system should  ideally be a real-time 
system  that can  react  to the input within  the  certain time 
bounds.  The  time  bounds  constrain  the maximum latency 
for the system  to identify  to  an  intrusion after  its  appear-  
ance.   Consequently,  the  analysis  of an  intrusion  detection 
system   should  be  done  in  a  fast  and  continuous manner, 
namely, in real-time or near-to real-time. 
The  DCA  can  internally  process  input data in  real-time. 
However,  this  algorithm requires  a further  analysis  process 
which is thus far performed offline. To develop the DCA into 
a fully functioning intrusion detection system, it is desirable 
to improve the real-time capability of the algorithm by mod- 
ifying  the  analysis  component.   Initially, it is important to 
decide at which point the analysis  component should process 
its current batch of data, in order  to derive intrusion scores 
for the  identification of intrusions.  This can be achieved  by 
applying segmentation to the analysis  process  of the DCA. 
As the word suggests, segmentation involves slicing the out- 
put data into  smaller  segments with a  view  of generating 
finer  grained  results, as well as performing analysis  in  par- 
allel with the detection process.  Segmentation is performed 
based  on a fixed quantity of output data  items  or 
alterna- tively on a basis of a fixed time period.  Thus,  
segmentation enables  the system  to  perform  periodic  
analysis  whenever sufficient information is presented during  
detection. 
The  aim  of this paper  is to investigate two segmentation 
approaches and  to explore  the applicability of segmentation 
to the DCA. The investigation is focussed on the comparison 
between  the  standard DCA  without  segmentation  and  the 
two newly introduced segmentation approaches.  A range  of 
segment sizes in both  data quantity and time are varied  to 
demonstrate any  potential  effects.   To  test  our  hypotheses 
we use a large  real-world  dataset based  on a medium  scale 
port-scan of a  university  computer  network.   We  intend  to 
use this investigation as a basis  for the further work on the 
development of a  dynamic real-time solution  for the  anal- 
ysis of the  DCA.  The  presented  experiments  are necessary 
steps  towards achieving  this  aim.   The  paper  is organised 
as follows:  the details  of the DCA are  described  in Section 
2; real-time analysis  and  segmentation are demonstrated in 
Section 3; the experiments are  explained in Section  4; the 
results  and the analysis are reported in Section 5; and finally 
the conclusions and  future work are drawn  in Section 6. 
 
2. THE DENDRITIC  CELL ALGORITHM 
 
2.1 The Biological Background 
The DCA is a population based algorithm, capable of pro- 
cessing  multiple input sources,  originally  designed  to solve 
problems within  intrusion  detection.   As previously stated 
the blueprint  for the  DCA  is the function  of the dendritic 
cells (DCs)  of the innate immune system,  which is the body’s 
first line of defence against invaders. In nature DCs have the 
ability  to combine  a multitude of molecular information and 
to interpret this information for the T-cells  of the adaptive 
immune  system,  to induce appropriate immune  response  to- 
wards  perceived threats. 
Signal  and  antigen are  the two types of molecular  infor- 
mation  processed  by  DCs.    Signals  are  collected  by  DCs 
from their local environment and consist  of indicators of the 
health of the  monitored  tissue.   DCs  are  sensitive  to  three  
types  of signal:  PAMP signals  derived  from  molecules  pro- 
duced exclusively  by invading  micro-organisms; danger  sig- 
nals generated as a result of cell stress  and unexpected cell 
death; and  safe signals  produced by  healthy  cells.  In addi- 
tion, DCs exist in one of three states of maturation to per- 
form their immune function.  In their  initial immature state, 
DCs are exposed to a combination of these signals.  Cells ex- 
posed  to higher  concentrations of PAMP and  danger signal 
transition to a fully mature form and can instruct the adap- 
tive immune  system  to activate.  Conversely, higher  concen- 
tration of safe signal induces  partial or ‘semi-maturation’ of 
DCs  and  have  a suppressive effect  on the  activation  of the 
adaptive system. 
Additionally, during  their  immature phase  DCs  also  col- 
lect  debris  in  the  tissue  which  are  subsequently  combined  
with  the molecular  environmental signals.   Some  of the de- 
bris  collected  are  termed  antigens,  and  are  proteins  origi- 
nating  from  potential  invading  entities.   DCs  combine  the 
‘suspect’  antigens  with  evidence  in  the form  of  signals  to 
correctly instruct the adaptive immune  system  to respond, 
or  become  tolerant to the  antigens in  question.  For  more 
detailed information, refer to Lutz and  Schuler [13]. 
The  resulting algorithm incorporates the state transition 
pathway, the environmental signal processing procedure, and 
the correlation  between  signals  and  antigens.  In  the algo- 
rithm signals  are  represented as  real  valued  numbers   and 
antigens are  categorical values  of the objects  to be  classi- 
fied.   The  algorithm is based  on  a  multi-agent framework, 
where each cell processes its own environmental signals and 
collects antigens. Diversity  is generated within  the cell pop- 
ulation through the application of a ‘migration threshold’ - 
this value limits the number of signal instances an individual 
cell can  process  during  its  lifespan.   This  creates  a variable 
time window effect, with  different cells processing  the signal 
and  antigen input streams over a range  of time periods [15]. 
The  combination of signal/antigen  correlation and  the dy- 
namics  of a cell population are responsible for the detection 
capabilities of the DCA.  In the remainder of this section  we 
describe  the algorithmic details  of the DCA implementation. 
 
 
2.2 The Deterministic  DCA 
In this  paper  we describe,  implement  and  apply  the  sys- 
tem based  on the deterministic version  of DCA  (dDCA) [9] 
for testing our hypotheses with respect to the addition of an 
improved  analysis module. However, a third signal category 
is added  to  the input signals  due  to the complexity  of the 
testing dataset. The  dDCA  was introduced for providing  a 
reproducible and  tractable system  that is  ideal  for further 
analysis  and development.  The dDCA employs a population 
of artificial  DCs,  each  of  which  has  the ability  to combine 
multiple signal sources  to assess the  environmental context, 
as well as asynchronously sample another data stream - anti- 
gen.   The  correlation  between  signals  and  antigens  is used 
as  the  basis  of identifying the intrusions  contained  within  
the input data. To accomplish this, the standard dDCA  has 
three  phases,  which  are  system  initialisation, data  process- 
ing and  offline  analysis, as shown  in Figure  1.  The  system 
initialisation phase  involves  generating the initial  DC  pop- 
ulation. Each  DC in the population is assigned  with  a par- 
ticular  migration  threshold.   The migration threshold of a 
DC is sequentially increased by a fixed number  as its index 
number  increases.   As a result, the migration  thresholds of 
the whole DC population form a uniform  distribution, which 
creates diversity  in the population. 
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Figure 1:  Three phases of the DCA and the future development of the real-time analysis, the offline analysis 
process will   be replaced by a real-time analysis component,  which performs  analysis whenever sufficient 
information is  presented during detection. 
 
 
 
Following this phase,  the input data (signals and antigens) 
are fed to the  data processing  phase.  This phase  consists of 
three sub-functions, which are data assignment, signal trans- 
formation, and  temporal  correlation. Firstly, the data as- 
signment function separates signals and  antigens within  the 
input data, so that the  signals  are then  passed  to the  signal 
transformation function, while the  antigens are allocated to 
particular DCs selected from the population. Secondly,  the 
signal  transformation function performs  the transformation 
from  input  signals  to  output signals.    As  all  DCs  receive 
the same numerical  set of signals for each iteration, the pro- 
cessing  of a single  signal  instance is performed  globally.   A 
user-defined number   of signal  sources  are involved  as  the 
input signals,  pre-categorised as  either  ‘PAMP’  (the  third 
signal  category added), ‘danger’  or ‘safe’. The  semantics of 
these signals  are listed as follows: 
•  PAMP: a signature of abnormal behaviour, e.g.  errors 
per second.  An increase in this signal is associated with 
a high confidence  of abnormality. 
 
•  Danger:  a measure of an attribute which increases  in 
value  to indicate  an  abnormality.   Low values  of this 
signal  may  not be  anomalous, giving  a  high  value  a 
moderate confidence  of indicating abnormality. 
 
•  Safe: a measure which increases  value  in conjunction 
with  observed  normal  behaviour.   This  is a confident 
indicator of normal, predictable or steady-state system 
behaviour.  This signal is used to counteract the effects 
of PAMPs and  danger  signals. 
where Oj    are the output signals,  n is the number  of 
output signal categories minus one, Si  is the input signals  
and  Wij is the transforming  weight  from  Si   to  Oj .  The  
output sig- nals can be accessed  by all DCs in the  
population.  Thirdly, each  DC performs  a temporal 
correlation function between signals  and  antigens 
internally.   An  individual DC  creates a  time window  
specified  by its migration threshold,  signals and antigens 
which appear within this time window are cor- related with  
each  other.    As  suggested in  [9], to perform correct 
correlation, the signals are supposed  to appear  after the 
antigens, and the delay should  be shorter than the time 
window created by each  DC.  In the mean  time,  the  system 
also performs  summing  of the output signals.  Once  a DC’s 
cumulative CSM exceeds its migration threshold, it changes 
the state and  becomes  a  matured DC.  As a result it  stops 
performing signal transformation and  temporal correlation. 
The association between  the cumulative k and sampled anti- 
gens within  each DC is termed the  ‘processed information’, 
which  is then presented  by  the  cell to  the analysis  phase. 
Once  a matured  DC  has  presented  the processed  informa-  
tion, it is reset  to an immature DC, and  hence the DC pop- 
ulation size is kept constant. 
In the offline analysis  phase,  all the processed information 
presented  by  the matured DCs  is  collated for the analysis 
process.   The  analysis  is  performed per  ‘antigen  type’  - a 
collection  of  identical antigen instances.   The  outcome   of 
the analysis  process is a measure of whether an antigen type 
is an  intrusion or not,  such  measure is termed  ‘Kα ’, which 
is calculated by Equation 2 [9], 
P 
k
 
As suggested by  immunologists,  safe signals  always  have  a 
negative effect to output signals,  and  PAMP signals have  a 
greater effect than danger  signals.  Such relationship is rep- 
Kα = i P αi ∀ i (2) 
resented  by predefined weights  in the algorithm. Two  out- 
put signals are derived  from signal transformation, which are 
‘CSM’ and ‘k’. The calculation of output signals is displayed  
in Equation 1, 
n 
Oj  = 
X
(Wij  × Si ) ∀j (1) 
i=0 
where αi  is the  number  of antigen type α sampled  by DC i, 
and  ki  is its cumulative k. The  greater the value  of Kα , the 
higher  the probability  that antigen  type  α  is  an  intrusion. 
The  dDCA  implementation is shown as Algorithm 1 [9]. 
As mentioned previously, the analysis  process in the dDCA 
is performed offline after  the data processing  phase,  which 
is insufficiently effective  for an  intrusion  detection  system. 
 
 
input  : antigens and  signals 
output: antigen types plus Kα 
set DC population size; 
initialize  DCs; 
while data  do 
switch input  do 
case antigen 
agCounter++; 
cellIndex  = agCounter % populationSize; 
DC of cellIndex assigned  antigen; 
update DC’s antigen profile; 
end 
case signal 
calculate csm and  k; 
foreach DC  do 
DC.lifespan -= csm; 
DC.sumK += k; 
if  DC.lifespan <= 0 then 
record  antigens, DC.sumK; 
reset DC; 
end 
end 
end 
end 
end 
foreach antigen type  do 
calculate Kα ; 
end 
Algorithm 1:  Pseudocode of the  dDCA implementation. 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, we intend to move the analysis  phase  to be with 
the data processing  phase,  as  indicated  in  Figure  1.   The 
analysis  process can be then performed periodically to iden- 
tify intrusions during detection, that is, in real-time. 
 
 
3. REAL-TIME ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 Real-Time Analysis And Segmentation 
A  real-time analysis  component is essential for  develop- 
ing  an  effective  intrusion detection system  from  the DCA. 
Such component performs  periodic analysis  of the processed 
information  presented  by  DCs,  to  continuously identify  in- 
trusions during detection. An effective and fully functioning 
intrusion  detection  system   should  be  able  to  identify  the 
intrusions as quickly  as possible,  as accurately as  possible, 
and  hence  detection speed  and  detection  accuracy are  two 
major  indicators of performance.   Most  of the techniques 
can produce  reasonable detection accuracy, if sufficient time 
is  given.    But as  demonstrated  before,  detection speed  is 
the actual key to the  performance of an intrusion detection 
system.   If an  intrusion detection system   fails  to  identify 
the intrusions in time,  no further responses  against the  in- 
trusions can be made.  This  leads to the eventual success of 
attacks, which is a fatal failure of an intrusion detection sys- 
tem. Therefore, if the intrusions are identified too late, even 
with 100% detection accuracy, it all becomes meaningless in 
terms of system  defence.   As a result, we propose  integrat- 
ing real-time analysis  with  the DCA,  to  improve  detection 
speed without compromising detection accuracy. 
If the  real-time analysis  is to be performed during detec- 
tion,  one  issue  needs  resolved,   that is,  when  the analysis  
should  be  performed.   This  issue  could  be  solved  by  ap- 
plying  segmentation to the  DCA.  It is  different  from  the 
moving  time  windows  method described  in  [11], which  is 
used  in the pre-processing stage  to smooth noisy input sig- 
nals,  as  segmentation is performed in  the post-processing 
stage  for the purpose  of analysis. As the processed informa-  
tion is presented  by matured DCs  over  time, a sequence  of 
processed  information is being  generated during  detection. 
Sesegmentation involves partitioning this sequence  into rel- 
ative smaller segments, in terms of the number  of data items 
or time.  All the generated segments have the same size, and 
the analysis  is performed within each  individual  segment. 
Therefore, in each segment, one set of detection result (Kα 
per antigen type) is generated, in which intrusions appeared 
within the duration of this segment can be identified. 
First of all,  segmentation  can  produce   multiple  sets  of 
results, rather  than  one  set  of  results  produced  by  non- 
segmentation  system.   This  enables the system to  perform 
analysis  in real-time (online), rather than offline, as all seg- 
ments  are processed  during  detection. In addition, segmen- 
tation distributes the analysis  process  into multiple  steps,  
instead of performing at once.  This  can reduce the  compu- 
tation power  and  time  required for the analysis  process,  so 
segmentation can effectively enhance  detection speed.  More- 
over,  as the processed information is presented by matured 
DCs  at different  time  points  over  the duration, analysing 
the  sequence of processed  information  at once  ignores  the 
temporal  difference  of each  piece  of processed  information. 
As a result, same  antigen  type  which  causes  malicious  ac- 
tivities at one point but does nothing at another point may 
be classified  as normal  rather than an  intrusion.  This  can 
be avoided  by applying segmentation, as it features periodic 
analysis  that can  cope  with the inherited time differences. 
Therefore, the system  can  effectively  discriminate  the ac- 
tivities which  are  intrusions from  those which  are  not, and 
hence the detection accuracy is also improved. 
The  most  important and  in  fact  the  only  factor  of  seg- 
mentation  is the segment  size.  It determines  how soon the 
intrusions can  be identified.  The  smaller the segment  size, 
the sooner  the intrusions  can  be identified, and  vice versa. 
Moreover,  the segment size may also influence  the  sensitiv-  
ity of  the final results.  If the segment size is too large,  the 
results  can lose the sensitivity and thus the system loses the 
ability  to identify  true positives. However,  if  the segment 
size is too  small,  the results  may  be  too  sensitive,  and  the 
system  can  generate false  positives.   In this  paper, we only 
introduce static  segmentation  with  a fixed segment  size to 
the  system,  as  the effect  of different  segment  sizes on  the 
detection performance needs to be investigated first.  Even- 
tually a dynamic segmentation approach will be developed,  
in which the segment size varies based  on the real-time sit- 
uations during  detection. 
 
3.2 The Approaches To Segmentation 
Two segmentation approaches are  applied, namely  ‘anti- 
gen  based  segmentation’  (ABS)  and  ‘time  based  segmen- 
tation’  (TBS). These  two  approaches  set  the segment size 
respectively according to two  factors,  which  are  the num- 
ber of sampled  antigens or the processed  time. As data ac- 
cumulates during detection, theses factors dictate at which 
point the analysis  should be performed. The number  of sam- 
 
PAMP Danger Safe 
CSM 4 2 6 
k 8 4 -13 
 
Table 1:  Weights  for signal  transformation. 
 
 
Parameter Value 
Population  size 100 
Migration  thresholds 12 × x, x ∈ [1, 100] 
Segment  size  (ABS) 1 × 10n ,  n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
Segment  size  (TBS) 1 ×10n ,  n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} 
 
Table 2:  Experimental  parameters. 
 
 
 
pled antigens indicates the amount of potential suspects that 
have  been  identified by the system, that is, the quantity of 
objects  to be  classified.   ABS  creates  a  segment  whenever  
the number  of sampled  antigens  reaches  the segment  size, 
and  the analysis  is  performed within  this segment.  Similar 
work  was  done  in  [12], in  which  the overall  network  traf- 
fic  is  partitioned into  subsets  of manageable size,  and  the 
analysis  is performed within  each partition.  Conversely, the 
processed time implies the quantity of signals that have been 
processed,  as one set of signals is updated once per iteration 
in the algorithm. The processed  time determines the  quan- 
tity of evidence  that can  be used  for supporting classifica- 
tion.  TBS creates  a segment whenever  the  defined  time pe- 
riod elapses,  and  the analysis  is also performed within each 
segment.  Such  an  approach is commonly  used  in  real-time 
control  of robotics, for example,  to periodically compute the 
next  steering  command in  motion  planning to avoid  colli- 
sions [6]. The concept of using segmentation with  the DCA 
is  not  entirely  novel,  preliminary  work  of ABS  and  TBS 
has  been  performed in [10] and  [15] respectively.  However, 
the corresponding experiments  took  only  a  cursory  glance 
at segmentation.  In this  paper  we  examine  the  addition of 
segmentation in much greater detail  than in previous  work. 
Segment  size  is  vital  to  the  quantity  of the number   of 
sampled  antigens or  the processed  time  contained  in  each 
segment.   In  order  to perform  sensitivity  analyses, a  range 
of segment  sizes are  tested, to find out their  effects  on the 
algorithm’s performance. Although ABS and TBS employ a 
fixed segment size, they also both  involve dynamics of vari- 
ous system factors.  In ABS the number  of sampled  antigens 
required for each segment is fixed, resulting in the processed 
time  contained  in each  segment  being  variable.  For  exam- 
ple, one segment can last 10 seconds,  another one with  the 
same number  of processed  antigen can last  over 30 seconds. 
Whereas, in TBS the time required for each segment is fixed, 
resulting in  the  number   of sampled   antigens  contained  in 
each segment being variable. For  instance, one segment can 
have 100 processed  antigens, and  another one can have over 
500 or even 1000 processed  antigens.  As a result, by inves- 
tigating both  segmentation approaches, different aspects of 
system  behaviour can  be  explored.  This  can  provide  more 
insights into the algorithm, which are useful for further de- 
velopment of dynamic segmentation in the future. 
 
4. THE EXPERIMENTS 
We use an intrusion detection dataset to test the described 
segmentation  approaches integrated  with  the dDCA.   The 
systems  are programmed in C with a gcc 4.0.1 compiler.  All 
experiments  are  run  on an  Intel  2.2 GHz  MacBook  (OS  X 
 
10.5.5), with the statistical tests performed in R (2.8.1). The 
predefined weights used  for signal  transformation  in Equa-  
tion 1 are  displayed in Table 1, they are  the  same  as those 
used  in previous  work  [10].  All other  experimental param- 
eters  are  listed  in  Table  2.   Sensitivity analyses  of various 
population sizes [9] have  shown  that 100 is an  appropriate 
value to use.  The fixed number  related to the assignment of 
migration  thresholds  is set  to  ensure  the migration  thresh- 
olds  of most  DCs  in  the  population are  greater than the 
strength  of a  single  signal  instance, so that these  DCs  can 
last longer than one iteration. 
 
 
4.1 The SYN Scan Dataset 
SYN scan  is an intrusion technique used  by attackers for 
exploiting the vulnerabilities of victim machines. The  SYN 
scan dataset was collected under the scenario that the scan is 
performed by an insider, who can be a legitimate user of the 
system  performing  unauthorised activities.  The  SYN  scan 
dataset [7] is  chosen  as the input data of the system. This 
dataset was collected  through an ssh connection, when both 
anomalous and  normal  processes are included. This dataset 
is  large  and  noisy,  making  the  problem  difficult  to solve. 
It is ideal  for  the  purpose  of  testing, as  the segmentation 
approaches are proposed to improve  the DCA.  The  dataset 
consists  of over 13 million  antigen instances and  more than 
4800 sets of signals. 
In  [9] the authors use  only  danger  and  safe  signal  cate- 
gories in dDCA  for a simple dataset. But for the purpose  of 
ease  of analysis, in this  paper  we use  all  three  signal  cate- 
gories, including  PAMP, danger and safe.  This  dataset was 
originally  used in [8], where all seven signals were used.  Only 
the most appropriate three  signals are selected,  because  the 
aim  of this  paper  is to introduce the concept  of  segmenta- 
tion rather than solving  the problem. The PAMP signal  is 
the number  of ICMP  ‘destination  unreachable’ (DU)  error 
messages  received  per  second.  When  the  closed  ports  of a 
host  are scanned, a large amount of DU error  messages  can 
be generated by the firewall.  The  danger  signal is based the 
ratio  of TCP packets to all other  packets  processed  by the 
network  card  of the  scanning host.  A burst of this  ratio is 
not usually  observed under normal  conditions, which means 
something malicious  could  be  happening.   The  safe  signal 
is derived  from  the  observation  that during  SYN scans  the 
average  network  packet size reduces  to a  size of 40 bytes. 
The scans tend  to send small sized packets in large quantity, 
big packet sizes indicate normal  behaviours of the network. 
One  set  of signals  is captured per  second.   All  signals  are 
normalised into the range within  [0,100], to match the pre- 
defined  weight for  signal  transformation.  These  signals  are 
plotted in Figure  2. 
The  process  IDs  (PIDs) whenever  a system  call  is  made 
on the host are recorded as individual antigens, but only the 
antigen types with  high frequency  are of interest. The num- 
ber of each interesting antigen type per second is plotted Fig- 
ure  3.  The  antigen  types  of  interest  include  ‘Nmap’,  ‘Fire- 
fox’ and  ‘Pts’.  Nmap is the  program used  for invoking  and 
performing  SYN scans to the victim  machines, Pts (pseudo-  
terminal  slave)  demon  process  is the parent  of the Nmap 
process, and Firefox is performing web browsing throughout 
the recorded session.  As a result, the antigen types of Nmap  
and  Pts are  considered to  be  anomalous, while the  antigen 
type of Firefox  is normal. 
Seg Min Mean Max Stdev
Nmap 
1 × 102 -3358.0 -929.9 679.0 512.8
1 × 103 -2785.0 -935.2 606.0 465.8
1 × 104 -2225.0 -934.8 496.6 372.4
1 × 105 -1547.0 -932.7 131.8 334.4
1 × 106 -1157.0 -951.5 -354.7 234.1
Firefox 
1 × 102 -3574.0 -963.0 679.0 539.5
1 × 103 -3178.0 -993.6 606.0 509.0
1 × 104 -2806.0 -985.5 526.2 405.6
1 × 105 -1812.0 -980.5 163.4 355.3
1 × 106 -1357.0 -988.0 -387.9 264.4
Pts 
1 × 102 -3523.0 -953.8 679.0 535.3
1 × 103 -3178.0 -992.0 606.0 511.2
1 × 104 -2806.0 -985.0 493.7 404.2
1 × 105 -1816.0 -980.6 152.4 354.2
1 × 106 -1359.0 -994.0 -406.4 265.8
 
 
 
Figure 2:    Input signal  values against  time  series 
(moving average  with intervals of  100,  per selected 
signal category, used for plotting the graph, but not 
the actual input of  the  system). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Number  of  each antigen  type  per  second 
against time series (moving average with intervals of 
100, per antigen  type  of  interest, used for  plotting 
the graph, but not the actual input of the system). 
 
 
 
The antigens and signals are sorted according to their time 
stamps as the input data. As Nmap  and  Pts are considered 
responsible for intrusions,  we expect  to  see  high  Kα   values 
for Nmap  and  Pts are produced by the system  during  scan- 
ning  activity.   Whereas  Firefox  is considered as  a  normal 
process,  so low Kα  values  for Firefox  are expected. 
4.2 Experiments And Hypotheses 
Two  sets  of experiments  are  conducted,  to  examine  the 
effects of ABS  and  TBS  with  the  dDCA. The  experiments 
performed are listed  as follows: 
 
1.  Experiment 1 (E1):  experiments using the ABS ap- 
proach  with various  segment sizes are performed. This 
corresponds to the null hypothesis (H1) that changing 
the  segment  size  of ABS  makes  no  significant differ- 
ences to  the  results.  The  comparisons are  performed 
between one segment size and  another. 
 
2.  Experiments 2 (E2):  experiments using the TBS ap- 
proach  with various  segment sizes are performed. This 
Table 3:   Summary of  Kα    values per antigen  
type when different  segment  sizes are applied  in 
ABS. 
 
 
 
corresponds to  the null  hypothesis (H2) that  chang- 
ing the  segment  size of TBS  makes  no  significant dif- 
ferences  to  the  results.  Similar  comparisons are  per- 
formed  between  one segment size and  another. 
 
In  addition to  H1   and  H2, two  more  hypotheses  can  be 
tested by using the results of E1 and E2.  The third hypoth- 
esis (H3) is that applying segmentation makes no significant 
difference  to the  results, which can be tested by the results 
of segmentation approaches with  the result  of the standard 
dDCA.  The fourth hypothesis (H4)  is that changing  seg- 
mentation approach from ABS to TBS  makes no significant 
differences  to the results. 
 
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Experimental Results 
The experimental results  consist  of the Kα  value per anti- 
gen type when various  segment sizes are applied.  One set of 
Kα   values  of all involved  antigen  types  (one  Kα   value  
per antigen type) are generated within each segment. These  
Kα values  are used for identifying the anomalous antigen 
types within the particular duration covered by a segment.  
Each row  of  Table  3 and  Table  4 represents  the statistics  
of  all Kα   values  of an  antigen type over  all generated  
segments. The  experimental  results  of ABS  show  that  the  
minimum of Kα   values  increases,   whereas  the mean,  
maximum and standard deviation of Kα   values  decrease,   
as  the segment size  increases.   Similarly,  the  experimental  
results   of TBS indicate that the minimum  and mean  of Kα  
values increase, while the maximum and standard deviation 
of Kα  values de- crease,  as the segment size increases.  It 
appears that chang- ing segment  size in both  segmentation 
approach can  make differences  to the  results, but the  
differences  are  not obvi- ous.  As a consequence, more 
rigourous statistical tests need to be performed, in order to 
examine  whether the differences are significant or not. The  
focus of these statistical tests is to examine  the  effect of 
segmentation with  various  segment sizes for each  antigen 
type, rather than the differences  be- tween normal  and 
anomalous antigen types as shown in [10]. 
 
 
5.2 The Statistical Tests 
As  all  experimental  results   are  normally  distributed,  a 
two-sample  two-sided  t-test (α  =  0.05)  [3] is used  to  test 
Nmap 
10 1 × 102 1 × 103
1 0.89 0.98 0.63 
10 − 0.94 0.65 
1 × 102 − − 0.66 
Firefox 
10 1 × 102 1 × 103
1 < 0.05 0.17 0.51 
10 − 0.94 0.88 
1 × 102 − − 0.91 
Pts 
10 1 × 102 1 × 103
1 < 0.05 0.20 0.52 
10 − 0.99 0.88 
1 × 102 − − 0.89 
Nmap 
1 × 103 1 × 104 1 × 105 1 × 106
1 × 102 0.24 0.65 0.93 0.75
1 × 103 − 0.97 0.94 0.81
1 × 104 − − 0.95 0.80
1 × 105 − − − 0.80
Firefox
1 × 103 1 × 104 1 × 105 1 × 106
1 × 102 <  0.05  ∗ <  0.05  ∗ 0.57 0.74
1 × 103 − 0.50 0.68 0.94
1 × 104 − − 0.88 0.97
1 × 105 − − − 0.92
Pts 
1 × 103 1 × 104 1 × 105 1 × 106
1 × 102 <  0.05  ∗ <  0.05  ∗ 0.39 0.60
1 × 103 − 0.56 0.72 0.98
1 × 104 − − 0.89 0.91
1 × 105 − − − 0.87
 
Seg Min Mean Max Stdev 
Nmap 
1 -2248.0 -966.2 539.3 387.7 
10 -1630.0 -969.0 290.2 357.6 
1 × 102 964.9 -1065.0 -27.1 310.6 
1 × 103 -1008.0 -1049.0 -796.3 155.0 
Firefox 
1 -3445.0 -1146.0 561.7 513.2 
10 -2153.0 -1083.0 293.5 388.1 
1 × 102 -1080.0 -1114.0 42.6 325.7 
1 × 103 -1066.0 -1074.0 -797.7 214.0 
Pts 
1 -3445.0 -1142.0 540.4 515.1 
10 -2227.0 -1082.0 285.7 391.2 
1 × 102 -1082.0 -1110.0 -1.2 318.4 
1 × 103 -1065.0 -1065.0 -804.1 213.6 
 
Table 4:   Summary of  Kα    values per antigen  
type when different  segment  sizes are applied  in 
TBS. 
Table 6:  The p-value  of  two-sample  two-sided  t-tests 
for TBS (‘  ∗’  indicates a significant  difference). 
 
 
 
duce  significant  different  and  better results.   Whereas,  for 
normal   antigen  types  (not  intrusions),  this  indicates that 
segmentation approaches can produce  significantly different 
but not necessarily  better results.   As shown  in  the table, 
2 3 4 when  segment  size is equal  to  1 × 10 , 1 × 10 , or 1 × 10 , 
ABS can produce  significantly different and better results  of 
Nmap  and  Pts.  When  segment  size  is 1 × 105     or  
1 
× 106 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:  The p-value  of  two-sample  two-sided  t-tests 
for ABS (‘  ∗’  indicates a significant  difference). 
 
 
 
H1   and  H2.  The  comparisons are  performed within  each 
segmentation approach, by comparing the experimental re- 
sult of one segment size with  the experimental result  of an- 
other.  As shown  in Table 5, in ABS changing  segment size 
does  not  make  any  significant  differences  to the Kα   values 
of Nmap,  but it can make  significant differences  to the  Kα 
values  of  Firefox  or  Pts.  Therefore, H1  is rejected.   Con- 
versely,  as shown  in Table  6, changing  segment size cannot 
cause any significant differences  to Kα  values of Nmap,  but 
it  can  cause  significant  differences  to  Kα   values  of Firefox 
or Pts. As a result, H2  is rejected. 
In order  to test H3, the experimental results  of segmenta- 
tion approaches are compared with the result of the standard 
dDCA  (non-segmentation).  The comparisons are performed 
per antigen type for every segment size. As no randomness is 
involved in dDCA, the same sequence  of processed  informa-  
tion is analysed in both segmentation and non-segmentation 
approaches. The  difference is that the  standard dDCA pro- 
duces only one set of Kα  values of each antigen type, whereas 
systems  with  segmentation  produce  multiple sets  (equal  to 
the number  of  generated  segments)  of Kα   values.    There-  
fore,  the  Kα   values  produced by  the  standard dDCA  
are used  as the true means  in the one-sample one sided  t-
tests (α  = 0.05)  [3], to test whether the  means  of  the 
Kα   val- ues  produced by  segmentation  approaches are  
significantly different.  This  can indicate whether applying 
segmentation can  produce  significantly different  or  better 
detection  per- formance.  The  p-value  of all tests  are  listed  
in  Table  7.  If the p-value  is less than 0.05,  for  anomalous 
antigen types (intrusions), it implies  that  segmentation  
approaches pro- 
ABS can make  significant differences  to the results of Fire- 
fox, but not  the results  of Nmap  or Pts.   Conversely,  TBS 
can make significant differences to the results  of Firefox,  but 
not the  results  of Nmap  or Pts. In summary, segmentation 
approaches can make significant differences  the  results, and 
ABS  can  produce  better performance on identifying  intru- 
sions while TBS  cannot. Therefore, H3  is rejected. 
Even  though no  direct  statistical tests are  performed to 
test H4, the statistical  tests of other  hypotheses  can  indi- 
cate  whether it should  be rejected or not. Firstly, changing 
segment size in TBS has less effect on the results  than ABS, 
as shown  in  Table  5 and  Table  6.  Secondly,  ABS  can  pro- 
duce significantly different and  better results on identifying 
intrusions, while TBS  cannot. Therefore, changing segmen- 
tation approach from ABS to TBS  can  make differences  to 
the DCA,  and  H4  is rejected. 
As described above,  applying segmentation makes signifi- 
cant differences  to the results, since it has changed  the way 
of analysing processed  information.  It can  improve  the re- 
sults in  terms of identifying  intrusions,  this  applies  to the 
ABS approach in particular. However, segmentation cannot 
improve the results  on tolerating normal  processes, this may 
be because  of the ‘innocent bystander effect’ of the DCA [7]. 
This  effect  occurs  when  normal  processes  are  highly  active 
and appear  at the same time as the anomalous processes, the 
algorithm could classify normal  processes as intrusions (false 
alarms). This  is an inherited issue of the dataset which has 
not been  resolved.   In  addition, it appears  that ABS  per- 
forms  better than TBS.  It is possible  that the  number  of 
sampled  antigens is more  vital  to the analysis  process  than 
the processed  time.    As  a  result,  ABS  can  always  assure 
that each segment includes  sufficient processed  information, 
making  it  more  effective  for analysis.  Moreover,  changing 
segment size in both  approaches can make significant differ- 
ences to the results. This  is because  it produces the quanti- 
tative differences of processed  information per segment that 
is analysed by the analysis  process.  Furthermore, changing  
segmentation from ABS to TBS can make a difference to the 
detection  performance.  This  may  result  from  the  fact  that 
ABS can ensure  sufficient processed  information is included  
within  every  segment  for  analysis.   However,  TBS  cannot 
 
Seg Nmap Firefox Pts 
-966.21 -1389.04 -1005.66 
Antigen based  segmentation 
102 <  0.05  ∗ <  0.05  ∗ <  0.05  ∗ 
103 <  0.05  ∗ <  0.05  ∗ <  0.05  ∗ 
104 <  0.05  ∗ <  0.05  ∗ <  0.05  ∗ 
105 0.14 <  0.05  ∗ 0.21 
106 0.41 <  0.05  ∗ 0.44 
Time based  segmentation 
1 0.50 <  0.05  ∗ 1 
10 0.56 <  0.05  ∗ 1 
102 0.49 <  0.05  ∗ 0.95 
103 0.69 <  0.05  ∗ 0.69 
 
Table 7:  The p-value of one-sample one-sided t-tests, 
true means are listed in the second row (‘ ∗’ indicates 
a significant  difference). 
 
 
 
provide  such assurance. As mentioned previously, some seg- 
ments  in TBS can contain few or even no sampled  antigens, 
therefore nothing can be detected in such segments, as there 
is nothing to classify. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have shown that applying segmentation 
to the DCA  makes  significant  differences to the results.  In 
fact, the ABS  approach  can  improve  the results, in  terms 
of identifying intrusions. In addition, segmentation enables 
the  system   to  perform  periodic  analysis   on  the  processed 
information presented by the DCs.  As a result  it can effec- 
tively improve detection speed without compromising detec- 
tion accuracy.  Therefore, segmentation is applicable to the 
DCA.  Even  though segmentation  is not immune  inspired, 
it can  still  make  contribution  to the field of AIS,  as  it  can 
improve  the  system  performance of the  DCA.  As a result, 
more effective intrusion detection systems can be developed 
by integrating segmentation with  the DCA.  This  method is 
also applicable to other second generation AIS. 
This  is  not  yet  real-time  analysis,  as  the  segmentation 
approaches still  occur  after  a time  delay.  The  actual situ- 
ations occur  during  detection  always  change  in  a dynamic 
fashion.   Therefore, in  order  to perform  real-time analysis, 
an approach that can deal with online dynamics is required. 
Such an approach should be able to adapt and evolve during 
detection, so that it can deal with  new situations that have 
not been  previously seen.  This  leads  to the  future  work  of 
dynamic segmentation. 
To continue  this  research,  dynamic segmentation is to be 
explored  to develop  more  effective intrusion  detection sys- 
tems.   Moreover,  as the ultimate  goal  is to develop  a real- 
time  system   for  the purpose  of  intrusion  detection,  it  is 
necessary  to  use  formal  techniques available in the  area  of 
real-time systems.  For  example,  we can  use Duration  Cal- 
culus  [18]  to  specify  the  real-time system  demanded, and 
Timed  Automata [2] and  PLC  Automata [5] to  implement 
and  verify such system. 
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